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Were we ready for the crisis? I do not mean whether Switzerland had enough
hospital beds and ventilators, but whether its Federal Constitution was ready.
Arguably, the former are vital, and as regards the latter, Switzerland is under
no suspicion of losing its quality as a democracy and a Rechtsstaat. Still, the
constitutional questions raised by the Corona crisis are troubling. The federal
government is applying emergency powers unheard of since WW2, and which were
previously unimaginable for most. Legal scholars are only starting to grapple the full
implications of the crisis.
The following contribution will highlight areas that may be considered as the
hot spots of the legal challenges in Switzerland. It will describe the basis for the
emergency measures in place and analyze them in their constitutional context and
with respect to the role of Parliament and the Swiss cantons (states), before offering
a brief conclusion.
Emergency Powers of the Federal Government
The Constitution
In times of crisis, important decisions must be taken quickly. Typically, such powers
shift to the executive branch. Switzerland is no exception. The Federal Council
takes measures to safeguard external security, independence and neutrality of
Switzerland. According to Article 185(3) of the Swiss Constitution, the Swiss Federal
Council may issue ordinances and administrative acts in order to counter existing or
imminent threats of serious disruption to public order or internal or external security.
A "sister" provision is located in Article 184(3) of the Constitution, concerning
measures in respect to foreign policy (closing borders etc.).
It is undisputed that the current pandemic qualifies as an "imminent threat of serious
disruption to public order or internal or external security" under article 185(3) of the
Swiss Constitution. Less certain is the question whether the Constitution not only
allows police measures, but also financial ones aiming to address the social and
economic hardship that follows from the lock-down. The Federal Council invoked
this provision in order to support the Swiss bank UBS in 2008, but many doubted
the constitutionality of this help. However, newer doctrine tends to include social and
economic emergencies and measures addressing them.
The Epidemics Act
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The Swiss Epidemics Act of September 28, 2012 (EpA; Bundesgesetz über die
Bekämpfung übertragbarer Krankheiten des Menschen vom 28. September 2012,
Epidemiengesetz, EpG) distinguishes between the normal, the special and the
exceptional situation as far as communicable diseases are concerned. Switzerland
quickly moved to the exceptional situation, proclaimed by the Federal Council on
March 16, 2020. In these circumstances, Article 7 EpA applies. It reads as follows:
"If an exceptional situation requires it, the Federal Council can order the necessary
measures for the whole country or for individual parts of the country."
The Federal Council’s dispatch (Botschaft) accompanying this provision states
that this article is merely declaratory and says nothing more than the constitution
itself. There was no debate on this article during the parliamentary deliberations.
With hindsight, both the Federal Council and Parliament (as well as scholars)
have missed the opportunity to clarify one of the key questions of the current
pandemic, i.e. the relationship between this provision and Article 185(3) of the Swiss
Constitution, on the one hand, and existing laws and the Constitution, on the other
hand.
Empowerment
Contrary to what happened in the context of WW2, the Swiss Parliament
has not adopted – and is not planning to adopt – any "empowerment
act" ("Vollmachtenbeschluss") or any similar legal basis. Currently, the Federal
Council is exclusively acting based on the Constitution and on the Epidemics Act.
Emergency Measures of the Federal Government (Federal Ordinances)
The Federal Council has enacted several ordinances on the Coronavirus. One key
ordinance, the so-called Ordinance 2 on Measures to Combat the Coronavirus
(COVID-19) (Verordnung 2 über Massnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Coronavirus
(COVID-19)) regulates the lockdown. It is less strict than in some other countries.
There is no curfew, but the population and especially vulnerable persons are urged
to stay at home. Social gatherings are prohibited, and distancing is key. Universities,
schools, museums, restaurants and most businesses with customers are closed
but not the industry (see, however, Article 7e of the COVID-19 ordinance, whereby
"the Federal Council may in response to a justified request authorize the canton
concerned to restrict or suspend the activities of certain sectors of the economy for
a limited time and in specific regions"), supermarkets, and hotels. Some cautious re-
openings are planned from the end of April through mid-June.
This main ordinance is flanked by a myriad of other ordinances of the Federal
Council. They concern financial aid which is lent by private banks but fully
guaranteed by the Confederation up to the amount of CHF 500’000. Other
ordinances facilitate short-term work for enterprises, or concern special areas such
as culture, sports, education etc. Notably, the Federal Council has also cancelled
various deadlines, not only in debt enforcement and court proceedings, but also in
the area of political rights. In any case, the federal competencies are used broadly to
say the least. They affect everyone’s life in some aspect or other.
- 2 -
Emergency Measures – Constitutionality?
Before the Corona crisis, many scholars considered the emergency powers of the
federal government as relatively restrained compared to other countries and to
the constitutions of some cantons (states) in Switzerland. Indeed, more extensive
emergency powers were rejected by Parliament during the deliberations on the new
Swiss Constitution of 1999.
It was generally assumed that the Federal Council is bound to the constitution when
invoking its emergency powers. Arguably, the Federal Council is also bound to
federal laws. To be more precise, it may invoke the emergency powers only when
a legal basis is missing, and it cannot create a legal basis that contradicts existing
federal law (praeter legem, not contra legem). However, a closer look reveals that in
the current crisis, the Federal Council has often amended federal law, and that it has
actually done so quite openly by stating which provisions of federal law do not apply
or apply differently under the federal ordinances. The Federal Council has thereby
assumed powers that were typically reserved to Parliament.
Furthermore, several provisions of the federal ordinances are in contradiction with
the Constitution. Some deadlines in respect to political rights are regulated in the
Constitution but are now affected by the federal ordinances. Some measures of
the federal government clearly fall in the competences of the cantons. Contrary to
conflicts with federal legislation, the Federal Council has neither highlighted these
conflicts nor issued any statement in this regard.
To date, there has been little criticism of the measures of the federal government.
Legal scholars have not yet published comprehensive journal articles, but some
contributions are expected in the next few weeks and months. From preliminary
exchanges, it may be assumed that there will be voices criticizing the Federal
Council for overstepping the constitutional limits of its emergency powers. Others
will defend the federal government. From a practical standpoint, it was difficult if not
impossible for the Federal Council not to react. Legally, one may contend that the
emergency powers have been gradually understood more extensively in the past, so
as to include not only police action, but also measures aiming to address economic
and social hardships. Additionally, the Epidemics Act may also serve as a basis for
extensive governmental measures – or at least as an argument that when passing
the Epidemics Act, the Federal Parliament accepted far-reaching measures by the
Federal Council in case of a pandemic.
Personally, I believe that the Constitution allows federal ordinances to correct
federal laws if the (strict) requirements for an emergency are met. Indeed, arguing
to the contrary would mean that the Federal Council’s emergency powers would be
severely restricted. More troublesome are federal ordinances in contradiction with
the Constitution. Such derogations must be considered as ultima ratio and must be
swiftly approved by the Federal Parliament.
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Emergency Measures – The Role of Parliament
Self-Suspension of the Federal Parliament
The Federal Parliament was in session during the height of the crisis. Still, on March
15, 2020, the offices of both chambers decided to abort the session – although one
chamber, at the beginning of the same week, explicitly rejected such a motion. The
offices also suspended all committee meetings.
The decisions of the offices attracted widespread criticism. It is doubtful that
these decisions were legally correct; the offices of the chambers have mainly an
administrative function and their members do not enjoy superior authority compared
to the other MPs (see expert opinions). However, it is fair to say that the situation
in Switzerland was critical and that the decisions were taken under substantial time
pressure. It is also understandable that Parliament wanted to show its resoluteness
to contribute its share in fighting the crisis.
It is less understandable that the subsequent holding of an extraordinary session
was first requested by the Federal Council, and not by the MPs themselves.
Only after the request of the Federal Council did members of the senate file a
corresponding request. This request was symbolic, as it does not matter whether
Parliament is convened by the request of the government or by a quarter of the
members of a council (see Article 2 Federal Act on the Federal Assembly of 13
December 2002, Parliament Act, ParlA). The extraordinary session will start in mid-
May. That is a late response.
This is not to say that the Parliament was completely inactive. Parliament is
immediately needed when it comes to emergency spending. A delegation of both
chambers must approve immediate expenses and appropriation credits, which it did.
Approval and Oversight
What is the role of Parliament vis-à-vis the federal ordinances regulating everyday
life? A newer provision of the Government and Administration Organization
Act stipulates that emergency ordinances of the government must be ratified
by Parliament after six months at the latest (Article 7d of the Government and
Administration Organization Act of 21 March 1997, GAOA). However, in my view,
this article provides not only for a maximum duration: it also requires immediate
action both from the Federal Council and Parliament. As discussed, many of
the provisions of the federal ordinances alter federal law and some are even in
contradiction with the Constitution. Such a far-reaching application of the executive
emergency powers seems permissible only if these powers are brought back to the
realm of the rule of law as quickly as possible. Only Parliament can do so.
Parliament has its own clause enabling it to enact emergency legislation (Article
165 of the Swiss Constitution; there is another clause in article 173 lit. c of the
Constitution, which is however less clear concerning its boundaries, and which
provides for measures that are not much faster in passing than ordinary emergency
legislation of Parliament; hence, this second clause is rarely used). Federal
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legislation may be declared urgent by an absolute majority of the members of each
of the two chambers and be brought into force immediately. Contrary to what applies
to other federal laws, the right to a referendum is temporarily suspended in the case
of parliamentary emergency legislation. Most importantly, emergency legislation
of the Parliament must not necessarily have a constitutional basis. Acts praeter
constitutionem are possible (but limited concerning their duration). It goes without
saying that Parliament can also correct all contradictions between existing federal
laws and executive ordinances by passing emergency legislation. Hence, only
Parliament can legally resolve the tension – if not conflict – between the measures in
place on one hand, and federal law and the Constitution on the other. It should do so
as quickly as possible.
Emergency Measures – Federalism
Switzerland is a federalist state. From a Swiss perspective, it is interesting to see
that the equivalent of the powers now assumed by the federal government rest within
the states in the US and with the Länder in Germany (which is surprising, as the
Länder have less competences than the Swiss cantons).
The main federal ordinance concerning the Coronavirus has triggered a debate on
the residual powers of the cantons. It is clear from the text that the cantons may still
regulate questions not covered by the federal ordinances. Still, it is unclear what
shall happen to areas that have been addressed by the Federal Council only vaguely
or in principle.
The Federal Council has resolved one conflict with the canton of Ticino (at the
border to Italy), which had introduced stricter measures than on the federal level.
Legally, this was doubtful, but the Federal Council retroactively introduced a clause
allowing for such exceptions – a move that is creative from a legal standpoint, but
presumably politically wise. The Federal Council also authorized the canton of Ticino
to extend the lockdown by one week, contrary to what applies to the rest of the
country.
Conclusions
It is certainly too early to draw meaningful conclusions from the current situation.
Still, I think that the extent of the current crisis shows that emergency measures
should not be the task of the executive only. True, it is necessary that the executive
moves first, as it has the shortest response time. Still, in a crisis that presumably
lasts longer, it is the task of Parliament to legitimize emergency measures from the
executive and – at least in Switzerland – to provide for a solid legal basis of such
measures.
I am grateful to Dr. iur. Odile Ammann for helpful comments and suggestions.
- 5 -
